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Abstract Although living organisms are affected by many interrelated and
unidentified variables, this complexity does not automatically impose a fun-
damental limitation on statistical inference. Nor need one invoke such com-
plexity as an explanation of the “Truth Wears Off” or “decline” effect; similar
“decline” effects occur with far simpler systems studied in physics. Selective
reporting and publication bias, and scientists’ biases in favour of reporting
eye-catching results (in general) or conforming to others’ results (in physics)
better explain this feature of the “Truth Wears Off” effect than Rabin’s
suggested limitation on statistical inference.
Keywords statistical inference · complex system · selective reporting ·
publication bias · hypothesis testing
Yitzhak Rabin’s recent paper [10] in this journal draws attention to Jonah
Lehrer’s article “The Truth Wears Off” [7], which discusses the apparent
fading and shifting over time of experimental results and measurements in
science. Rabin outlines a model to try to explain this phenomenon. However,
Rabin makes a minor misstatement in the course of discussing his model,
and even after allowing for this misstatement his model does not seem to be
the best explanation of the “Truth Wears Off” effect.
I briefly summarize Rabin’s model here to elucidate the misstatement.
Consider N ≫ 1 systems, “each of which possesses a measurable attribute
(variable) X”, where X has Mx ≫ 1 possible values and lies between xmin
and xmax [10]. An experimenter might measure X for each of the N systems.
Rabin writes that for “a good statistical sample” one must measure N ≫Mx
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2systems. But this is not generally true, as is shown by considering (like Rabin)
the case where X is a continuous variable. Assuming xmax > xmin, it follows
that X can take on infinitely many values and so Mx is infinite. But it does
not follow that the sample size N must also be infinite for the sample to be
“a good statistical sample”.
This is so even for a discrete X with finite Mx. I find it reasonable to
define “a good statistical sample” as one where X ’s empirical cumulative
distribution function G(x) differs little from the true cumulative distribu-
tion function F (x) of the sampled population. If one measures X in a sim-
ple random sample from some population of systems, those X values are
independently and identically distributed. Therefore I can immediately ap-
ply the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz-Massart inequality: the probability that
G(x) differs anywhere from F (x) by more than some nonzero λ is at most
2 exp(−2Nλ2) [8].
Formalizing my definition of “a good statistical sample” as one where
|G(x) − F (x)| ≤ λ ∀x, where λ is the maximum deviation from the popu-
lation cumulative distribution function one can tolerate from one’s sample,
rearranging the inequality gives a probabilistic guarantee that the sample is
“good”. To ensure that the sample is “good” with at least probability p, the
sample size N must satisfy
N ≥
ln 2
1−p
2λ2
(1)
When Mx is of similar size to this bound (or greater), N need not be much
more than Mx for a good sample, in the rather strict sense I formalize it
here.
However, this side point — though worth correcting — has little bearing
on the main argument Rabin makes with his model. That argument is prob-
lematic for another reason: Rabin’s model does not represent the most com-
mon kinds of statistical analyses. Only occasionally do scientists determine
whether a variable is interesting or relevant by seeing whether its distribution
is flat.
More often, researchers’ statistical analyses — especially in the life sci-
ences — are based on hypothesis testing, which has a rationale something like
the following. One picks a hypothesis to test, makes assumptions about the
statistical properties of one’s sample, and uses those assumptions to compute
a sufficient test statistic S from the sample. If the assumptions hold and the
hypothesis is true, S has some probability distribution p(S). But if S’s value
lies in a low-probability tail of p(S), it becomes implausible that it came from
the distribution p(S), and the test rejects the hypothesis.
Does the core of Rabin’s qualitative argument carry over to this alter-
native methodology? At first glance it might seem that it does; S can be
influenced by many unknown variables just as X was. But statistical infer-
ence furnishes us with a powerful defence against this issue: as long as S
comes from the distribution p(S), it does not matter why or how it comes
from that distribution; significance tests that use S and p(S) continue to
work as advertised.
Consider an opinion poll that asks a few thousand people whether they
support a political party. In this scenario one is surely dealing with a complex
3system affected by many variables: people’s views of a political party surely
correlate with (and are influenced by) many variables unmeasured by such a
poll, such as the political views of one’s peers, which television programmes
one watches, and so on. As such, Rabin-like arguments by complexity would
seem to rule out reliable inferences from this polling technique. But in prac-
tice such inferences are possible. How?
It is possible because if one polls a representative, random sample of N
people from a large population, then the number of people S in the sample
who support a political party is binomially distributed with mean Np and
varianceNp(1−p), where p is the population proportion of people supporting
the party. This is the case however the people in the sample formed their
political preferences; it is enough to merely identify a sufficient statistic with
a known distribution.
There is an obvious objection to this kind of inference: it relies on an
assumption that a test statistic S follows a particular distribution. But this
objection can be accommodated by testing the assumption just as if it were
any other hypothesis. A researcher can gather many random, representative
samples from the same population, calculate S’s value for each sample, and
then use a test like the χ2 test or Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to discern whether
their sample of S values deviates significantly from S’s assumed distribution.
In the polling example, one might calculate S values for many polls of sample
sizeN (with the polls carried out at about the same time so that the unknown
parameter p changes little across polls), and use a χ2 test or G-test to check
that those S values are approximately binomially distributed.
This argument undercuts Rabin’s explanation for the difficulty of repro-
ducing certain scientific results. In addition to abstract argument, there is
some empirical evidence against Rabin’s explanation in the very New Yorker
article he references [7]. Rabin’s attempted explanation for poor reproducibil-
ity points the finger at the complexity of the systems biomedical scientists
study, and the large number of mysterious variables that can influence the
dependent variables of interest. As such, if Rabin’s argument has correctly
fingered the reason for this effect, the effect should be virtually absent from
physicists’ studies of parameters describing fundamental particles, which are
far simpler systems experimented upon under strongly controlled conditions.
Yet Lehrer is able to point to “the weak coupling ratio exhibited by decaying
neutrons, which appears to have fallen by more than ten standard deviations
between 1969 and 2001” (but see [9]) and “the law of gravity”! More gen-
erally, Henrion & Fischhoff’s well-known paper [4] documents long-standing
systematic errors in past estimates of physical constants that were only cor-
rected after much subsequent research.
Hence I disagree on two grounds with Rabin’s conclusion that the com-
plexity of complex systems imposes a fundamental limitation on statistical
inference. Firstly, in many cases those limitations can be circumvented with
the intelligent use of statistics; secondly, less complex systems can be as sus-
ceptible to the “decline effect” as more complex systems.
I nonetheless agree with Rabin’s closing statement that “critical studies
that attempt to test the validity of known results should be encouraged by the
scientific community”, subject to mild caveats. (For example, it’s surely the
4case that some results are more in need of testing than others. Cost-benefit
analyses could help scientists direct their testing efforts to where they’re most
needed. It would of course be a waste of resources to have every scientist try
to falsify every single result they felt like testing.) But I have more humble
reasons for wanting critical scrutiny. Scientists do have research designs like
randomized trials and controlled experiments, and tools like TETRAD [2,
3,11] that are capable of unpicking causal relationships from a thicket of
variables. The problem is not that they can’t work but that scientists fail to
use them — and where they do use them to perform a critical study, they are
less likely to eventually publish the results when they disagree with earlier
work.
I infer that much of the blame for the “Truth Wears Off” effect should
really go to two of the more mundane causes Lehrer suggests: publication
bias and selective reporting. This might sound unduly cynical, but I think
it’s consistent with the evidence. Daniele Fanelli’s 2009 meta-analysis of sur-
veys found that, on average, about 10% of scientists admitted to engaging in
any given questionable research practice (QRP) [1]. A more recent survey of
psychologists found that over 90% “admitted to having engaged in at least
one QRP” [5]. QRPs often fall in the grey area between best practice and un-
ambiguous misconduct, and can introduce the kind of modest but systematic
biases that would lead to the “Truth Wears Off” effect. One could read this
as a depressing conclusion but I am cautiously optimistic: the problem is less
with “fundamental problems that face any experiments on complex systems”
and more with predictable biases against which we can take precautions.
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